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Full Length Research Paper

The impact of humanitarian aid on post conflict development in Borno State

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The protracted Boko Haram insurgency continue to ravage the Northeast Nigeria with 1.8 million people displaced and 7.1 million in dire need of humanitarian aid. The conflict also caused a great havoc on the giant stride towards development of these states which Borno state being the worst affected where an estimated 751.78 billion naira (6.898 billion dollar) worth asset were destroyed. The humanitarian aid and United Nations agencies has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the most affected group since the declaration of the state of emergency in 2013. The study aimed at assessing the impact of humanitarian aids on development of Borno after the conflict with a view of identifying the opportunities in humanitarian aid that can foster development of the state. The study adopted a combination of disaster relief, missionary and Oxfam model of humanitarian and development assistance and uses the mixed method of research. The data collected for this study were drawn largely from primary source and secondary data which were analysed using quantitative analysis tool and qualitative content descriptive analysis. The study established that the impact of the protracted insurgency on the development of the state manifest across both human capital and infrastructural indicators. The study reveals that humanitarian aid being provided cut across all the developmental indices and is highly connected to the development. Hence, should consider as a foundation for post conflict development. Therefore, it was recommended that government should take the lead in coordination of humanitarian aid in line with its development agenda.

Key words: Humanitarian aid, post - conflict, Boko Haram insurgency, development, Borno State.

INTRODUCTION

Since the declaration of state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in May, 2013 by the Federal Government of Nigeria, people affected by the insurgency have been receiving different kinds of relief aid in form of humanitarian assistance from donor agencies through United Nation (UN) agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) both National and International as well as multinational companies and

individual philanthropists. The protracted insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria has left over 7.1 million people in serious need of humanitarian assistances across the most affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa living 1.8 million people as internally displaced (Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy, 2018). To date, there still remain a number of villages, communities and local government areas (LGAs) that are still inaccessible for

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both civilians and humanitarian aid workers due to the presence of the insurgents and ongoing military operations. High levels of displacement, including secondary and tertiary displacement, have been witnessed in major centers, including those from inaccessible areas, with the majority of new arrivals in dire conditions and in need of urgent, life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection interventions. The crisis is argued to have become prolonged due to the transformation of the insurgency into multinational dimension which made it difficult for the Nigerian government to address it effectively (Gilbert, 2014).

Borno State is the most affected state by the insurgency where all the local government areas were with the exception of three captured/taken over by the Boko Haram fighters for more than a period of three months. Till date, several villages and communities are inaccessible to civilians due to the activities of the insurgents and the accelerated military operations. Many people from these areas have lost their properties and are living in internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, others are embedded in some other communities while others have completely relocated from the state. It is estimated that civilian infrastructures worth US\$9.2 billion were destroyed and accumulated output loss US\$8.3 billion as a result of the insurgency in the northeast with Borno state taking the hardest hit (Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy, 2018). The Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy (2018) aptly noted that Northeast Nigeria was already plagued with high levels of poverty, inequalities, including gender, underdevelopment, unemployment, poor governance, political marginalization, weak justice systems and ecological degradation prior to the beginning of the insurgency in 2009. However, Borno as a state before the insurgency was one of the major business centers of Northeast Nigeria with the advantage of being a border state with Chad, Niger and Cameroon. It was experiencing relatively good economic growth with well-established growing small and medium scale enterprises through transnational trade and a good connection with the commercial city of Kano state. But this growth has been completely halted with a steep decline in development following the continued destruction of lives and properties by the insurgency which has left a large population in dire need.

Hinds (2015) affirmed the existence of relationship between humanitarian and development aids but insisted that various approaches are required to understand this relationship. Hendrickson (1998) argued that as much as the core humanitarian values of promoting human welfare and alleviating suffering remain as valid today as ever, the image of the humanitarian system carries these values at the global level has been tarnished. He added that this contributes to the reasons why the humanitarian system is highly criticized with many allegations of exacerbating wars for prolong aid which is also the reasons why humanitarian assistance being provided are

largely inadequate and many international donor agencies turn their back on suffering people. This implies that where the humanitarian assistance is effective, the long-term political measures and development assistance required to prevent populations sliding back into crisis conditions are often not forthcoming. This has informed this work to ensure that Borno state is moved out of the woos and understand what lays ahead of the protracted humanitarian assistance for better planning. It has been acclaimed by the Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy (2018) that high levels of poverty, inequalities, including gender, underdevelopment, unemployment, poor governance, political marginalization, weak justice systems and ecological degradation prior to 2009 were the underlying causes of the insurgency. Hence, the need to address those issues to prevent the recurring of the crisis. However, Imhonopi and Urim (2016) opine that the insurgency also directly impacts on the development of the state especially with the large security vote allocated to counterinsurgency while lamenting the necessity of addressing the insecurity as security is prerequisite to development of the country.

Problem statement

The continued attacks and havoc on the people and their properties by the insurgent groups has kept the largest workforce/population of the state unproductive and dependent on humanitarian aid for survival (Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy, 2018). "In many areas across Borno State, market and trade routes continue to be disrupted as a result of insecurity and impassable roads during the rainy season. These, and other existing bans on fish trade and restrictions on purchasing fertilizers, impact negatively on trade flows and activities". According to Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy (2018), this has also stopped commercial activities in many parts of the state while reducing the same in the Metropolitan city of Maiduguri where many business owners and investors have vacated for safety of their lives and properties. Thus, continued reliance on humanitarian aid by the workforce population, destruction of lives and properties, migration of business/withdrawals of investors, stoppage of commercial activities in many locations in the state and the protracted activities of the insurgents are considered as issues of great concern to the future development of the state.

The restrictive movement impairs the ability of the affected population to engage in livelihood and income generating activities. World Food Programme (WFP, 2018) reported that 39% of IDPs households in Borno State have no access to farmland. The report of joint assessment carried out by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Food Programme (WFP) in 2018 on safe access to fuel and energy showed that

the security situation also impacts on access to fuel and energy for cooking food. The report says that 85 percent of women and girls interviewed responded to heightened protection risks when collecting firewood from the bushes around their communities. These security risks are both fear of attack and abduction by the Boko Haram insurgent groups which were reported in the past and the risk of explosive remnant of war and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) trap laid by the insurgent groups targeting the military convoy.

Definition of terms

Humanitarian aid refers to actions undertaken by organization or organizations that are intended to alleviate extensive human suffering within the borders of a sovereign state. It can be defined as the assistance provided for the purposes of saving lives, alleviating suffering and upholding human dignity during and after crisis or natural disaster and to prevent occurrence as well as equip the people to withstand future occurrence. Humanitarian aid is guided by key humanitarian principles; humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence as affirmed by UN General Assembly resolution and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2019). It is also referred to as Humanitarian Assistance, Relief Aid, Emergency Relief or Emergency Aid. Humanitarian aid differs from development aid as stated by Dieci (2006) "Saving the lives of people exposed to immediate risks due to natural or manmade disasters is the ultimate goal of any relief intervention. Development strategies aim at introducing structural changes in a given context. He added that these two kinds of intervention often require specific skills, approaches and, most of all, specific timings". The processes that lead to changes in the living standard, infrastructural, human capital and economic of a place or improvement in the socio-economic, environmental and political growth of the country of a place is considered as development. Whereas, development aid is the financial support given to a country or place to support the process of its growth economically, socially, politically and to enhance environmental sustainability. By August 2019, an approximated sum of US\$2.23 billion were spent in providing relief support to the affected population in Northeast according to Financial Tracking Services (FTS) of United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2019). Yet there are many vulnerable individuals and groups in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Since the commencement of full humanitarian assistance to the people affected by the insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria in 2014, 47 different International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and over 180 joint Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and Community Based

Organizations (CBOs) as well as UN agencies and International Committee of Red Cross have provided different forms of humanitarian aids to the affected populations in the Northeast Nigeria in addition to multinational companies and individual philanthropies.

The concept of conflict lacks universally accepted definitions as such many scholars define conflict in different ways. Rakhim (2010) defines conflict as an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance within or between social entities. It may be limited to an individual as intrapersonal conflict. Nicholson and Michael (1992) defines conflict as an activity which takes place when conscious beings (individuals or groups) wish to carry out mutually inconsistent acts concerning their wants, needs or obligations. He added that it is an escalation of a disagreement, which is its common prerequisite, and is characterized by the existence of conflict behavior, in which the beings are actively trying to damage one another. Conflict is defined as a clash between individuals arising out of a difference in thought process, attitudes, understanding, interests, requirements and even sometimes perceptions (Juneja, 2019). It results in heated arguments, physical abuses and definitely loss of peace and harmony. Hence, Conflict can be described as any form of friction, disagreement, or discord that arises within or between a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. Therefore, the ideology of Boko Haram which considers western education as a taboo or sin and their outright rejection of the National constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is in total discord with what the stand of the government of the country Nigeria hence, the conflict.

Conflict distorts the normal social, economic and political pattern of a society and introduces a new way of living. In a protracted conflict like the case of Northeast Nigeria and indeed Borno state, the way of life of the people is completely changed with the introduction of survival strategies that emanate as social vices and uncivilized. The live of dependency on aid for survival, the live of confinement to camp as internally displaced persons, lack of access to basic services, living in an ungoverned space, inaccessibility to civil and legal system among others are characterized by the days of conflict. Post conflict as it implies may seems so simply to define from the concept of war/violent crisis and peace but very complex to define in real practice. Frere and Wilen (2015) highlighted three important issues with definition of post conflict; it does not mean end of war; it has political consequences; and it does not define the typology of the conflict that is over. Therefore, they opine that post conflict should be defined from a process-oriented approach as transition continuum with different milestone. Hence, this study considers post conflict as process which begins with seizes fire agreement between

the Boko Haram insurgent group and the Nigeria government and indeed Lake Chad region multinational arm forces.

Since the hope of return of peace and normalcy in Borno state even amidst the protracted insurgency and humanitarian responses is not totally lost and is being gradually achieved. It is essential to set in place plans and strategy towards rebuilding the state and restore it to the path of development. These informed this research to assess the impact of the ongoing humanitarian aid on the development of the state in the post conflict era with a view of identifying the opportunities in humanitarian aid that can foster development.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In anticipation of the return to peace and normalcy in Northeast and Borno state, it is thoughtful to start viewing and strategizing towards development of the state beyond the long-term impact of the insurgency as much is being done to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain the dignity of human lives through humanitarian aid. Branczik (2004) insisted that the key part of peace accord in the aftermath of war is external development assistance to reconstruct a country's infrastructure, institution and economy. This requires; reconstruction of properties and infrastructures, transition to normal security conditions, a functional judiciary to enforce the rule of law, governance and government services, democratization, economic development and local capacity building (Branczik, 2004).

Borno State conflict context

Since the creation of Borno State in Northeast Nigeria in 1976 with the capital in Maiduguri, the state has experienced a series of crises before the advent of Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 which has caused serious chaos in the Northeast region, the entire country Nigeria and also draws the attention of the international community. The region has witnessed a series of religious crises starting from the Maitatsine crisis in the 1980s which affected Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Kano state followed by different religious based crises especially in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, and Yobe state between the 1980s to 2002. The current Boko Haram is historically traced back to a formally reorganized group called Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization since 1995 led by Mallam Lawal who handed the leadership to Mohammed Yusuf when he left Nigeria to pursue his education in Saudi Arabia (Ekanem et al., 2012). Under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the group was alleged to have been opened to political influence and popularity which is built on his open teachings against western education which is the stage of metamorphoses

into Boko Haram with the aim of establishing Sharia government in Borno and neighboring states (Gilbert, 2014). Since inception of the Mohammed Yusuf leadership, series of religious based violence were witnessed in the state and the region especially between the years 2004 to 2010 until the full-boom insurgency. Yusuf was very critical of the government and involved in official effort to introduce Sharia in several Northern states in the year 2000s (CGAR, 2014). Although from the outset the group mission was to impose Sharia on Nigeria, Mohammed Yusuf preaching and interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to constituted authority (Anyadike, 2013). The deaths of Mohammed Yusuf in Nigeria Police Force custody as well as his father in-law Ustaz Buji Foi who finance the group and the incarceration of members of the group by state authorities lead to the birth of the highly violent Boko Haram group under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau (Awortu, 2015). Awortu (2015) aptly noted that "Yusuf adopted a non-violent approach in his campaign but hoped to achieve his objectives through constant preaching in Mosque and forming alliances with politicians especially Sheriff Lawal " unlike Abubakar Shekau.

Abubakar Shekau and Khalid Al-Barnawi led Boko Haram cashed in to the failure of the government to provide basic welfare schemes to the citizens, poverty and joblessness among youth as a tool of recruiting their membership in addition to refugees from the wars over the border in Chad. They exploited these gaps as a strategy of providing welfare package to their membership such as food, money and employment to attract youths to join them and buy into their fundamentalist Islamic viewpoint of societal organization as a preference and more profitable to the western capitalist mode of production being adopted by the country Nigeria which is not beneficial to the youth (Awortu, 2015). At this stage, they drive operational fund from wealthy businessmen and politicians both from within and outside Nigeria which help them to succeed in recruiting more youths as fighters and suicide bomber who uses of lethal weapons such as: rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank missiles, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), surface-to-air missiles, armoured tanks, A-K 47 assault rifles, as well as machetes and daggers for the purpose of meting out mayhem to the Nigerian state, which have adversely affected her economy considering the high rate of loss of lives and properties (Awortu, 2015; Gilbert, 2014).

The brutal leadership of Abubakar Shekau institutionalized the group into an insurgent group named Jamatu Ahli Al-Sunna lil Da'wa Wal Jihad (JAS) which metamorphoses into Jama'at Ansari Al-Muslimin fi Bilad Al-Sudan (Ansaru) as a result of leadership tussle between Abubakar Shekau and his lieutenants Khalid Al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur due to their affiliation with the leadership of Al-Qaida who later distanced itself from JAS

(Ahmed, 2018). After reuniting of Abubakar Shekau with the Ansaru group, he pledging allegiance to Islamic State (IS) which lead to the emergence of the new name Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) but his leadership couldn't last long because of the confirmation of the IS leadership's (Al-Baghdadi) doubts about his "despotic character, ideological extremism or "Guluw", and his poor operational skills" as reported by his lieutenants Abu Musab Al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur which brought the former in to the leadership (Ahmed, 2018). This leads to the split of the group and the return of Abubakar Shekau led group to the previous name JAS. The group is characterized by ruthless and indiscriminate attacks on both civilian population and the military while Abu Musab Al-Barnawi led ISWAP group are known for "sophisticated, organized and large-scale attacks on military camps and oil exploration sites" according to Ahmed (2018).

Concept of prolong conflict in Borno

The concept of Prolong conflict as described by Wikipedia, technically refers to "Protracted Social Conflict" as opined by a theory developed by Edward Azar. Protracted Social Conflict is the "hostile interactions between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence; when a group's identity is threatened or frustrated, intractable conflict is almost inevitable" Wikipedia. Considering the Boko Haram insurgency in this context, prolong conflict is the long period of over 10 years' violence attacks of Boko Haram insurgents on the military and civilian population as a result of ideology discord and the desire to establish a caliphate state.

The Boko Haram insurgency started with simple attack on schools, Christian groups and churches, to attacks on security personnel, government and United Nations facilities, Mosques and all civilian populations who do not buy into their ideology using small and light weapons and improvised explosive devices (IED). But now the group has built strong military forces with sophisticate weapons and military strategies as evident in the series of video messages from the insurgents group on Youtube. The group has executed series of well schemed attacks using qualitative military hardware as allegedly reported by military personnel and confirmed by some videos released by the group which show the might of the force they have built over the decade of their operation in the region. Gilbert (2014) opine that "the dexterity, sophistication and fluidity of Boko Haram within the North East geopolitical zone coupled with its prolonged confrontation with the Nigerian state as the sole legitimate monopolist of the instruments of force and violence has apparently, conferred the toga of invincibility

on the group". This can be linked with the series of transformation the group has underwent over this period especially with their alignment with international terror groups such as Al-Qaida and IS who are believed to be providing support to the group (Ahmed, 2018). The prolong conflict has been reported to have claimed more than 27,000 lives with hundreds of women and girls in abduction, 146 children (mainly girls) forced to carry person borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) with 46 children used for the attack between January to September 2018 only according to (Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy, 2018). The strategy further reported an estimated civilian infrastructural and asset damage of worth US \$ 9.2 million and output losses of US \$ 8.3 million since the inception of the crisis with the highest impact in Borno state in addition to the various levels of displacement; primary, secondary and tertiary witnessed by civilian population to major local government and city centres in the Northeast. The situation has forced many people away from their homes and sources of livelihood; farming, fishing among others with 1,483,566 persons displaced in Borno state according to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round XXIX (November 2019). Although military has continuously claimed to have liberated all local government from the captivity of the insurgents, many are limited to the garrison towns without access to their original homes and sources of livelihood with the highest population living wholly dependent on humanitarian aids with 7.1 million people in dire need of humanitarian aid across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of the Northeast (Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy, 2018). This has been the case since the declaration of full state of emergency in northeast especially Borno state which is of high concern to all and sundry.

Efforts to restore peace in the region cannot be discussed without mentioning the steps taken by the previous administration of Goodluck Jonathan after a series of military responses to the consideration of amnesty for the insurgent groups after a series of clamour by Northern leaders including the Sultan of Sokoto among others. On Thursday, April 7, 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan approved the setting of an Amnesty committee for Boko Haram but the leadership of the insurgent group outrightly rejected the offers and made fun of the initiative and rather chooses to increase attacks. Similar approach was repeated by President Muhammadu Buhari who declared his intention to grant amnesty to repented Boko Haram fighters (The Guardian, 2018) which was implemented in the re-integration of more than 1000 ex-Boko Haram fighters in according to Prager and Adamu (2019). However, these efforts were met with great criticisms from Nigerians especially among those who seek to understand why the government would reward killers with freedom and funds, and those who are of the opinion that such gesture will breed room for the advent of more criminal and terrorist groups while others

insisted that faceless people cannot be granted amnesty. But this still happens under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) partnership with the government which has brought some levels of skepticism among the people of Borno.

On the other hand, Nigeria government has continued to claim that Boko Haram has been technically defeated even when the group could still launch attacks and kill up to 86 persons at a single attack as reported by Punch Newspaper online February 6, 2016. However, the term “technically defeated” remains unclear as the government claims that they have liberated all local governments under the captivity of the insurgents. But the term liberated is also arguable since displaced populations still have no access to their homes/villages rather they are clustered within the sanctuary/garrison locations mostly local government centers. The military has launched a series of operations ranging from “Operation Lafiya Dole” to “Operation Last Hold” to “Operation Positive Identity” among other operations. Yet the insurgents have consistently attacked both the military bases and civilian populace in the local government areas and most recently the persistent attacks on the Maiduguri – Damaturu road which further instill fear among the civilians as reported by Daily Trust on 12th February, 2020. These attacks might likely be attributed to continued changes in the military strategies especially the recent super camp strategy that withdrew all military bases to a fewer number of camps called “Super Camp”.

Concept of humanitarian aid

Humanitarian aid is defined as the assistance provided for the purposes of saving lives, alleviating suffering and upholding human dignity during and after crisis or natural disaster and to prevent occurrence as well as equip the people to withstand future occurrence. It is an assistance given to solve the immediate need of the population affected by disaster either man-made or natural. This assistance is meant to be for a short-term before a longer-term aid can be provided by the government. DuBois (2018) describes humanitarian aid as “a set of short-term programme methodologies and an operational objective to meet the urgent needs of people, as opposed to building systems that will, over a longer course of time, meet those same needs (that is, development, resilience etc.)”. The aid is provided on a basis of protection principles which support the rights outlined in humanitarian charter as the right to life with dignity, the right to humanitarian assistance and the right to protection and security (Sphere Association, 2018). The concept of humanitarian aid is geared towards ensuring that no human being is sacrificed for a purpose as pointed by Albert Schweitzer “Humanitarianism consists in never sacrificing a human being to a purpose”. This

means that the dignity of life and the respect deserved by human beings must be protected at all courses in humanitarian response or actions. This informed the key principles on which humanitarian aid operated. The international humanitarian law is fundamental because all people affected by the crisis have a right to receive protection and assistance with dignity. And humanitarian aid is built on the international humanitarian law which forms the humanitarian principles that guide humanitarian aid. While humanitarian charter provides the ethical and legal backing for the protection principles, the core humanitarian standards and sphere minimum standard for humanitarian response (Sphere Association, 2018). “The Humanitarian Charter summarizes the core legal principles that have most bearing on the welfare of those affected by disaster or conflict” Sphere Association (2018).

Seblewengel Debebe Dagne quoted in his thesis thus “According to Akramov (2012) Official Development Aid (ODA) falls into three different categories. The first category is economic aid, which mainly focuses on raising capital accumulation by increasing a recipient nation’s stock of physical capital such as machinery, buildings and equipment. Economic aid is divided into two, those allocated for production sectors which includes agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction, trade and tourism sectors and the others allocated for developing economic infrastructures, which include equipment for communication and electronic networks, road and railroad construction, financial infrastructure and energy distribution. The second category of ODA is social aid which is intended to build additional physical and human capital in recipient countries to promote economic growth, which includes education, healthcare, and sanitation and drinking water supplies. The third category is humanitarian aid which is intended for consumption during emergency situations which includes medicine and food”. This implies that humanitarian aid is aimed at live saving (medicine and food).

History of humanitarian aid

The history of humanitarian aid can be traced to Florence Nightingale (1854) and Henri Dunant (1859). During the Crimean War, Nightingale and her team of 38 nurses provided health, nutrition, clean water and hygiene services support to wounded soldiers on voluntary bases and also mobilized more volunteers to support the course. She provided the bases for statistical measurement of mortality and morbidity rate as well as cause of death which provided evidence based information for her campaign for the need of people affected by conflict. She advocated for the establishment of a Royal Commission on the Health of the Army in Britain (Wikipedia).

The origin of formalized humanitarian aid is tied to the

story of Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman and a social activist. He works with volunteers to assist wounded soldiers across all nations (French, Italians and Austrians) establishing the foundation of humanitarian principles; impartiality and neutrality. He advocated for the creation of a permanent relief society and international humanitarian law. These gain grounds with the endorsement of his vision by the International Committee for Aid to Wounded in Situation of War established by private Geneva Society of Public Welfare. This committee laid the foundation for the International Committee of Red Cross which is to date the largest providers of humanitarian aid in the world and the guidance of international humanitarian law whose foundation was built on the treaty signed by 16 states who attended the Geneva Convention between 8 and 22 August, 1864 (Wikipedia).

Humanitarian aid in response to natural disaster can be traced to the call of international communities' attention to the North Chinese famine of 1876 to 1879 which would've claimed 10 million lives according to Wikipedia. This was championed by Timothy Richard which resulted in the establishment of the Shandong Famine Relief Committee with the participation of many diplomats, businessmen, and protestants and catholic missionaries. The same campaign was launched in response to the great famine of 1876 – 1878 in India and a famine relief fund was set up in the United Kingdom which raised up to £426,000 within the first few months.

Prior to the 1980s, humanitarian aids were championed by private sectors with limited financial and organizational capacities until the BBC global news coverage that exposed the reality of the challenges around aids and the mobilization of celebrities to galvanize large scale government led humanitarian funds to respond to global disaster.

There were no well-organized international humanitarian aids until 1991 when the United Nations established an office of coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA) under resolution 46/182 which is saddled with the responsibility of leading, coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance. "It was designed to strengthen the United Nations response to complex emergencies and natural disasters, while improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field" OCHA (2019). Through this office, the UN Secretary General led the first ever World humanitarian summit in 2016 at Istanbul, Turkey where preventing and ending conflict, managing crises, and aid financing were the center of discussion (Wikipedia).

Humanitarian principles

According to Schweitzer, humanitarian aid differs from other relief and emergency aid and broad global welfare in that it includes commitment to the four core humanitarian principles; humanity, neutrality, impartiality and

independence.

Hence, organizations such as military forces and for-profit companies are not considered as humanitarian organizations because even though they provide life - saving and suffering alleviating services to the vulnerable communities, yet their responses are not based on humanitarian principles. These principles govern the way and manner humanitarian response is provided which is centered at the establishment and maintenance of access to the vulnerable groups affected by the disaster either man-made or natural.

Compliance with the humanitarian principles is essential to the lifesaving and suffering alleviation given to the vulnerable groups and to the coordination of the interventions. These are backed also by the protection principles which apply to all humanitarian response and all humanitarian agencies as outlined below;

- 1) Enhance the safety, dignity and rights of people, and avoid exposing them to harm.
- 2) Ensure people's access to assistance according to need and without discrimination.
- 3) Assist people to recover from the physical and psychological effects of threatened or actual violence, coercion or deliberate deprivation.
- 4) Help people claim their rights.

Core humanitarian standards

The core humanitarian standards set out nine quality and accountability commitments by organizations and individuals involved in humanitarian responses towards ensuring quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance they provide to the vulnerable target populations. The nine commitments according to Sphere Association, (2018) include;

- 1) Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant.
- 2) Humanitarian response is effective and timely.
- 3) Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.
- 4) Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation and feedback.
- 5) Complaints are welcomed and addressed.
- 6) Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary.
- 7) Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve.
- 8) Staff is supported to do their job effectively, and is treated fairly and equitably.
- 9) Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.

Prolong conflict and humanitarian aids

According to the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), many armed conflicts in history have been a long

war meaning that the protracted conflicts are not new with history tracing back to the work of Thucydides who gave a detailed account of the 27 years' war between Athens and Sparta. But the concept of protracted conflict today has some new features that are peculiar to our generations such as urban conflicts, involvement of new technology, affecting middle income and poorer countries, large and more diverse humanitarian sector participation and global media sector involvement among others (ICRC, 2016). Although there is not yet a universally accepted definition for protracted conflict, ICRC (2016) acknowledged that the phrase emerged from the work of Prof Edward Azar in 1970s and they characterized the concept with the following;

- i) Different types of protracted conflict based on its longevity
- ii) Fragmented conflicts that mutate involving the raise of many armed groups, splinting armed forces, etc.
- iii) Episodic in nature involving periods of different conflict intensity
- iv) Internationalization of the conflict
- v) Manifest of cumulative impact such as degradation of infrastructures, services and living conditions among others
- vi) Creation of extreme fragility in basic services, social, economic and environmental systems that support civilian populace.
- vii) Stricken number, concentration and new pattern of suffering.

Although the above characteristic defines protracted conflict in modern terms, the effects of the prolonged conflict are both systematic and all encompassing. Protracted conflict exert effects on people, the state and basic services, the region, humanitarian action and increased fragility of the public provision system (ICRC, 2016).

The protracted insurgency in the Northeast has yielded devastating effect on the geographical area of the country particularly the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe with the highest impact on Borno state which is the hub of the insurgent group. This has caught the attention of many international agencies and individuals especially with the hardship exerted on the vulnerable groups in the society; the displaced women, children and men. This informed the increased humanitarian aid support being pumped into these locations. Olojo (2019) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) recognized the effort of humanitarian aid organizations in supporting these vulnerable groups, however, he noted that aid organizations can only help to alleviate the symptom of the crisis but dealing with the root causes remains the job of Nigeria's government, and can no longer be neglected. Olojo added that humanitarian aid in Borno is faced with the problem of climate change while pointing challenges such as lack of accountability among over 150 NGOs operating in the state whose humanitarian motives are

still of suspicions to the government authorities and possible socioeconomic impact that may unconsciously arise from the humanitarian aid due to attractive financial rewards. Branczik (2004) also argued on the socioeconomic impact of aid while citing the instance of aid perpetuating a conflict in Sudan, where civil war lasted for well over a decade and over two billion dollars was spent on humanitarian aid. He added that "both rebel leaders and aid workers openly acknowledge that humanitarian aid, in addition to saving many lives, is a large factor in making it possible for the belligerent groups to continue fighting". This can be aligned with the realities of house rent in Borno and cost of other commodities as well as general inflation in the market as compared to other Northeast states that were not affected by the crisis. Furthermore, Olojo (2019) identified proactive policymaking to reinforce the state's capacity to address the societal challenges that may arise after humanitarian aid through foresight and political will to drive the implementation of Nigeria's Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism especially the third section which deals with community engagement and building resilience. Hence, government response to the insurgency must include planning beyond the short-term humanitarian aid provided by the aid agencies (Olojo, 2019).

In protracted conflict, effective humanitarian response can be achieved through adaptation of programming processes, practice and information management system to focus on long term outcome, achieving development holds by investing on essential services during conflict to reduce redevelopment and rebuilding cost, partnering for humanitarian sustainability and continuity in protracted conflict, doing annual planning with multi-year mindset through multi-year programming and financing and deepening community engagement through involving them in design, planning, implementation and evaluation of the interventions (ICRC, 2016).

Humanitarian aid contribution to Borno State

The importance of humanitarian aid can be traced to the purpose and/or its definition "saving lives, alleviating suffering and upholding human dignity during and after crisis or natural disaster". Humanitarian aid addresses the effect of conflict such as creation of social and economic dislocations, displacement of the people, collapse of state and civil society institutions, and disenfranchisement of peoples' means of livelihood, break up of communal living and hindrance of peoples' access to basic services according to International Labour Organization (ILO, 2004). By addressing this effect, humanitarian aid contributes to bring relief to the suffering of the people and contributes to rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement of the people affected by

conflict.

Borno state has suffered a protracted conflict of over a decade whose impact is manifest in the displacement of over 1.4 million people according to UNICEF report (2016), social and economic dislocation, and destruction of properties and sources of livelihood and hinders the access of more than 1.4 million peoples to basic services. However, through the humanitarian response, interventions were provided to the affected persons and communities in the areas of food security and nutrition, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health and shelter and settlement. All these interventions were provided with protection principles as pivotal to the provision and access to such services in a dignified way (Sphere Association, 2018). The intervention has gone beyond the life - saving to education of the young ones, rehabilitation, reintegration and resettlement of the conflict affected population. Also, restoration of telecommunication services provided by ICRC and reconstruction of major assets such as health and educational facilities; security facilities (building of police stations) and restoration of justice systems in the most affected LGAs of the state. According to Kallon (2019) the entire humanitarian aid agencies in operation across the Northeast Nigeria provided humanitarian aid to 5.6 million in 2017; 5.5 million in 2018 and over 4 million in 2019 (as of October) most affected people within accessible local government areas within the region.

Challenges of humanitarian aid in Borno

Humanitarian aid in Borno state the epicenter of the insurgency like other affected Northeast states suffers lack of due attention by United Nations (UN), International NGOs, Humanitarian donors and the government of Nigeria living a large population of displaced and affected people in dire need of aid as reported by McIlreavy and Schopp (2017) on Humanitarian Practice Network. Humanitarian aid continue to face the challenges of access to people with dire needs due to restricted security perimeter by the military as aptly noted by Eguiluz (2020) while the protracted conflict continues to displace people with dire needs who seek for sanctuary in garrison towns with restricted security perimeters thereby, lower the standard of aids provided. Eguiluz further argued that donor fatigue is not the problem as funding keeps coming but the challenge is to find implementing partners and delivering programmes outside the city. This can be attributed to reported cases of abductions and executions of aid workers by the AOGs. The perception of Nigeria government that INGOs were untrustworthy agents meddling with in Nigeria domestic affairs reported by McIlreavy and Schopp (2017) and other narratives associated with the military lockdown of aids agencies' offices in Maiduguri reported by media in September, 2019. This is also subject to

more scrutiny as many writers has different opinion about it.

Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy (2018) also agreed with Eguiluz (2020) submission on restricted security perimeters as a challenge facing the humanitarian aid in addition to bureaucratic impediments around; importation of life-saving drugs and other humanitarian goods, legal ambiguity and delay in INGO registration and high cost as well as delay in obtaining visa for international staff. The strategy also agrees with Olojo (2019) submission on climate changes as a challenge to humanitarian aid while adding that the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and IED planted on the road targeting military convoy.

Branczik (2004) identified efficiency and effectiveness, political dilemma and criticism of humanitarian organizations as the key problems of humanitarian aids while development aid is faced with lack of conflict preventive component in design, aid conditionality and efficiency and effectiveness problems. Inefficiency of humanitarian aid can sprout from the number of humanitarian organizations providing aid in Borno as earlier mentioned by Olojo (2019) and poor coordination with duplication of interventions while challenges of access to the vulnerable groups contributes to ineffectiveness as identified by Humanitarian Country Team in Nigerian Humanitarian Response Strategy (2018) that 13% of the population in dire need are not accessible. As rightly noted by Olojo (2019) "aid organizations..... alleviate the symptoms of the crisis but dealing with the root causes remains the job of Nigeria's government" political will beyond humanitarian alibi is essential to overcome the political dilemma.

Concept of post conflict development

Prolong insurgency often halt development stride and destroy efforts made toward developing the society especially as structure established towards achieving development goals of the state or a nation are destroyed by the insurgency.

This trough the state backward in the efforts towards achieving the developmental agenda of the state. According to the Borno State 2020 to 2030 Strategy: Transformation of Borno State document which contains the recently launched 25 years development plan of the state, 1.379 trillion Naira (6.898 billion dollar) worth assets were destroyed in the state as a result of the insurgency. Obviously, a setback in the development stride of the state which means that effort must be put in place to recover this damage before returning to the path of the development. This is a difficult impact of the insurgency as it does not only halt the development stride but revert the efforts made so far to achieve what was achieved thereby returning the state to a "ground zero".

Realizing the impact of the insurgency on the state and

the need to return to the path of development, the Borno state government proactively identified six (6) key priority areas for development and designed a strategy document for 10 years development with focus on those identified areas while designing 9 strategic pillars for actualising these priorities. The following areas were identified as priorities for the 10 years development plan of the state as contained in the 2020 to 2030 Strategy: Transformation of Borno State:

- i) Rebuild and sustain a society where our citizens and residents can live in peace and thrive by improving security and rebuilding communities.
- ii) Increase employment opportunities and decent work particularly for the youth by stimulating a vibrant economic sector, with particular focus on agriculture, livestock, fishing and commerce.
- iii) Develop healthy human capital through access to quality education and life-long learning, good healthcare, portable water and sanitation.
- iv) Reverse the trend of environmental degradation and promote sustainability.
- v) Rebuild and secure infrastructure to support inclusive economic growth and cater for both current and future population needs.
- vi) Re-energize and instill its cultural values of integrity, hard-work and dignity of labour, as well as respect for our fellow citizens regardless of gender, age or religion, and appreciation for the sustainability of our land.

These priorities will be implemented through nine (9) strategic pillars; human capital development, leadership in agriculture, health citizenry, regional trade hub, reconstruct, rehabilitate and resettle, purposeful infrastructure, accountable governance and peace and security.

Linkage of humanitarian aid with development

The continuous emerging of conflicts and the prolong humanitarian aids support especially in Africa has been reported to be mounting more pressure on the donors, governments and aid organizations as it overstretched funding that would have been used for development aids to underdeveloped countries that are mostly the crisis centers. Many experts agreed that if humanitarian aids are continuously planned and implemented in isolation from developmental aids, it will breed long term dependencies, undermine indigenous coping strategies and increase vulnerability in the long run (Bidder, 1994). Hence, the suggestion that humanitarian aids should be linked with development aids as aptly noted by Food Security Unit of the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University in its report in 1993/1994 which were affirmed by Bidder (1994) and Dieci (2006). According to the institution, "the basic idea is simple and sensible.

Emergencies are costly in terms of life and resources.

They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation and they have spawned bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organizational cultures, which duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them. By the same token, development policy and administration are often insensitive to the risk of drought and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. If relief and development can be "linked" these deficiencies can be overcome. Better "development" can reduce the need for emergency relief, better "relief" can contribute to development, and better "rehabilitation" can ease any remaining transition between the two". This can also be traced back to the ratification of the linking relief to rehabilitation and development as a central pillar in the national disaster prevention and preparedness strategy of Ethiopia in 1987 (Dieci, 2006). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) also noted that the high demand for humanitarian assistance with a record of 68.5 million displaced person worldwide in 2017 (with 80% conflict related displacement) and protracted crises has generated high demand for humanitarian assistance which are increasingly underfunded has necessitated the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 to succumb to the reality that humanitarian assistance alone cannot resolve the crises. Hence, the need for humanitarian-development-peace nexus (also called the triple nexus) and a New Way of working to reduce needs risks and vulnerability.

Therefore, Borno state that has experienced such a protracted crisis of over a decade with a full-fledged humanitarian aid assistance of over 6 years should have grown in the area of development with a well-defined development agenda that will fit in all interventions towards its development. Although, one could argue that because of the active conflict situation development should not be central agenda at the moment, but with the dynamics of the crisis in Borno state where the insurgent groups are forced into the hideouts in the Sambisa forest and bushes in the outskirts of the state, development initiatives can be tied to the ongoing humanitarian assistance. However, it is commendable of the state government to have looked beyond these challenges and developed a structured plan and strategy for the development of the state and deploys resources towards achieving that within a short, mid and long-term base.

The importance of linking humanitarian aid with development aid cannot be over emphasized as many scholars has argued the vitality of such approach to the future of the affected populations with a special emphasis on the "dependency syndrome" of protracted humanitarian aid resulting from protracted conflict as supported by Anderson (1999), Dieci (2006) and Olojo (2019) among other. According to Dieci (2006) "if prolonged over the years, relief interventions tend to be perceived by the beneficiaries as a structural solution to their problems. In some cases, food aid can create such a risk". He added

that coexistence of the two types of aid is not just in diachronically as first relief, then rehabilitation and finally development but also as synchronically. He opines that relief plans need to use development methodologies in order to be effectively "development oriented" which is an approach that includes enhancing local capacity (both human resource and institutional), the roles of local actors and a participatory approach to identification of priorities and strategies. "In a recent issue of the Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell outlined five reasons why linking relief and rehabilitation is receiving such prominence at this time. The first, as mentioned already, is concern about the increasing portion of aid budgets being spent on emergencies and how to strengthen the linkage with development aid. Second, it is acknowledged that emergencies can make subsequent development more difficult, by diverting funds from local institutions, or by creating new chains of command which are less responsive to development needs. Thirdly, rehabilitation has become much more important, especially given the close association between famine and war (or, in the case of Ethiopia, the after-effects of prolonged civil war linked with chronic under-investment in development). Fourthly, it is becoming widely accepted that the traditional compartmentalization between relief and development is artificial as far as poor people themselves are concerned. The poor living in the agriculturally marginal areas of Ethiopia, for example, live constantly with food shortages and the risk of famine and plan their livelihood strategies accordingly. In this context, as described earlier, it has perhaps become misleading to talk of a linear sequence of "relief-recovery-rehabilitation-development" - a more sophisticated approach is necessary, one that recognizes the complexity and diversity of livelihood (or, "survival") strategies. Finally, linking relief and development offers the possibility of a model whereby relief and development interventions can be implemented harmoniously to provide poor people with food security and efficient safety-nets, mitigating the frequency and impact of shocks (such as rain failure) and easing rehabilitation" quoted from Bidder (1994). This agreed with the submission of Dieci (2006) as argued on the potency of diachronically alignment of relief to rehabilitation and subsequent development to synchronically interweaving the aids.

Theoretical framework

In the International Political Economy literature a number of models have been developed by Scholars and Researchers alike to explain the pattern and flow of humanitarian assistance. Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008) have identified three models of humanitarian assistance which they distinguished by the type of assistance provided rather than the type of donors that

provided them. These models fall within the purview of both the government and private organizations.

The disaster relief model

The disaster relief model center on short-term humanitarian aid provided to crisis affected population such as war and natural disasters (earthquake, drought and flood) to save their lives and alleviate suffering. The assistance being provided are health, food, clothes, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene among other. The model provides an insight to the justification for development aids to areas impacted by crisis. Where catastrophe strike, destruction of life and properties damages the stride towards development of the area. It destroys years of tread towards economic growth and development of the area. This, therefore, stimulate the development partners to step in and provide development aid towards returning the area to the path of development. To this end the international community through the United Nations and other multilateral platforms often respond with adequate relief materials to alleviate the suffering of the people and possibly bring the affected people back on their feet. The disaster relief model is adopted by the United Nations through the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRC) located in Geneva. Lastly, despite the usefulness of the disaster relief model it cannot be used to explain, describe and prescribe the nature, motivation and implications of development partners support via humanitarian assistance to Northeastern states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.

The missionary model

The Missionary Model involves humanitarian assistance provided by missionaries based on charitable work in poor nations across the globe. Besides, such charitable gestures or programmes are helpful, though not without its challenges. They are means by which donors from developed countries channel their resources to people in developing countries who are in need of humanitarian assistance. However, many programmes provided by most missionaries are to address short term needs which may not create sustained local economic development. Besides, most of these programmes do not address the root cause of poverty. One of the missionary assistances provided in Africa was carried out by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) that funded a healthy fraction of their budget by selling to African countries some grain they ship from the United States. The charities are becoming international grain merchants and flooding local markets with cheap food which is sold and given away, competing with local farmers in Africa and driving down local prices and harming long-term recovery (Goldstein and

Pevehouse, 2008). Finally, one major shortcoming of the missionary model is that large scale humanitarian assistance provided to the people in the developing nations may not be appropriate to meet the needs of the local condition and culture of the people in need of humanitarian assistance.

The Oxfam model

The Oxfam model was built on continuous learning from short-term aid to disaster affected population to long-term development assistance through a bottom-up approach that focus on needs strategy. The model re-conceptualized donor relief aid from short-term assistance to long-term development as a result of it approach which consider donors as partners with the aid recipients working together to achieve a task. They thrive on the perceived collaborative relationship which is considered as necessary for peace and development. The model derived its name from an America charity called Oxfam, one of the global descendants of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief founded in Britain 1942.

The model relies heavily on the local communities to determine the need of the people and implement developmental projects. The Oxfam model sees "Genuine development" within the context that it: "enable people to meet their essential needs, extends beyond food aid and emergency relief; reverses the process of impoverishment; enhances democracy; makes possible a balance between population and resources; improves the well-being and status of women; respect local cultures; sustain the natural environment, measure progress in human, not just monetary terms; involve change, not just charity; requires, empowerment of the poor; and the Global North as well as the South" (Oxfam American News, 2008 cited in Potter et al., 2004). The model does not accept or grant funds to government but operate independently and engage the communities directly to address their developmental needs. Therefore, the Oxfam model bypasses governments and also bypasses the majority of money spent on humanitarian assistance globally (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2008). On the whole, the Oxfam model adapted to the study of development partners, humanitarian assistance and quest for reconstruction of Northeastern Nigeria.

METHODOLOGY

The study adopted a survey research design to collect relevant data to assess the impact of humanitarian aid on post conflict development of Borno State. Survey research design was used because it incorporates two techniques; qualitative and quantitative methods to answer research questions. Primary and secondary data were collected from Maiduguri Borno state using google survey interview and review of existing literatures. The population size according to 2006 population census stands at 543,016 persons however; the influx of IDPs due to the conflict has further

increased the population with an inaccurate estimation of the population size. The sampling frame includes government workers, humanitarian aid workers, academia, students/apprentices, private sector employees, self-employed and other daily workers within Maiduguri, Borno state. Due inaccurate estimate of the population frame, the research purposively targeted 100 respondent survey interviews. Therefore, a total of 100 respondents were randomly interviewed from the purposively selected population frame who are believed to have key information about the subject matter in consideration of the risks associated with travels outside Maiduguri town and to ensure data quality.

The development of the instruments underwent first, the casual analysis of the statement of problem in a broad spectrum of the activities were undertaken to achieve the research objectives. This was based on the topic of the study, bearing in mind the major factors as contained in the topic. Also, the review of relevant literature and the researchers' personal experience as a development worker helped in the development of the items for the study. A pilot test was administered to determine the reliability and validity of the instrument and the outcome was used to standardize the tool used for data collection. A reliability index value of 0.76 was determined using the Cronbach alpha test method.

Quantitative data from the questionnaire were downloaded on excel from the google forms earlier distributed. Data collected were collated, cleaned and analyzed using excel pivot table to categorize responses in percentages. The qualitative data generated from the semi structured questions were collated and descriptively analyzed. A conventional content analysis was used to analyze the findings and directly reported. The results obtained informed the conclusion drawn from the research.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The study aimed to assess the impact of humanitarian aid on development of Borno state after the conflict with a view of identifying the opportunities in humanitarian aids that can foster development of the state. The findings from the study shows that humanitarian aid has a positive impact on post conflict development of Borno state considering the different areas of the interventions. 77% of the study population affirms the existence of relations between humanitarian aid and development which agrees with the submission of Hinds (2015). The aid being provided covers different indices of development which is creating opportunity for the development of the state in the post conflict era. The research further reveals that 62% of the population opines that the relationship between humanitarian aid and development is positive and supportive to the post conflict development as aptly supported by Imhonopi and Urim (2016). In the efforts of the aid to save life and alleviate suffering of the conflict affected population, the aid brought about reconstruction of critical infrastructures that lays a foundation for the future development of the state in the aftermath of the conflict. The interventions in the areas of healthcare, nutrition, education, shelter reconstruction, food security and livelihood, water sanitation and hygiene and social cohesion/peacebuilding are essentially contributing to the post conflict development of the state because they re-established structures both infrastructural and socio-economical that

could be sustained towards post conflict development. 91.8% of the study population affirms the significance of the impact of the humanitarian aid on social and economic livelihood of the resident. Development is a product of socio-economic activities which could only be done by the living (human beings). In saving lives and alleviating suffering, humanitarian aid is sustaining the hope of future development because only the living could bring about development. While infrastructures both hard and soft reconstructed through the humanitarian interventions are essential components of development being a critical index of measuring development. The components of the humanitarian interventions that deals with the livelihood and social life of the affected population cannot be dented in the foresight of the post conflict development. This is because sustaining the economic viability of the affected state is a necessary building block for the future development because economy of the state is a pivotal index of measuring the level of development. It is also an integral to recognize the findings of the study which shows the contribution of the humanitarian aid to socio-economic of the affected population being an essential index of development as well.

Although, 62% of the study population believes that humanitarian aid would not cause any problem to the post conflict development of the state. The research reveals that humanitarian aid is faced with challenges of ineffective synergy, collaboration and coordination among the actors and the state government which have tendencies of affecting the post conflict development of the state. Yet, the worse challenges are lack of ownership and sustainability of the intervention among the local community and the government authorities. The infrastructural and socioeconomic developments brought into the conflict affected state through the humanitarian intervention which are supposed to lay the foundation for the future development of the state in the post conflict era will be a charade without intentional sustainable measures, acceptance and local ownership. This could also be attributed to a key finding in the research; unhealthy perception of government officials that pitch the people against aid workers. Where the aid workers are considered as the enemies, their interventions will be treated with disdain which will manifest in lack of sustainability. Therefore, government must lead the efforts towards ensuring community acceptance and ownership of the interventions towards its contribution to post conflict development as also suggested by Olojo (2019). Nevertheless, the findings of the study also shows that internal corruption, rivalry among humanitarian agencies, duplication of interventions poses a major threat to the post conflict development of the state but as earlier mentioned joint efforts with all actors will address this challenge. Although the research finding shows that amidst all the challenges identified with the ongoing humanitarian aid, the interventions would not cause any

problem to the post conflict development of the state. However, it is important to take cognizance of the fact that a significant number of the population holds a contrary opinion towards this as such extra caution must be taken to ensure that the latter is achieved. Figure 1 show the respondent opinion on the ongoing humanitarian aid causing any problem to the development of Borno State in post conflict period.

Finally, the research shows that the humanitarian aid provides a great opportunity for the future development of the state in post conflict. However, the state government must identify these opportunities offered by the aid and maximize it towards realization of its contribution to the post conflict development. The study has further revealed that the citizens expect more from the government to halt the insurgency. The commitment of the government and the military fighting the insurgency are questioned by the citizens as they believe that an overhaul of the strategy/approach of both government and the military, improved commitment and exploration of all available means of building peace are essential to bring an end to the insurgency. The necessity for the impact of humanitarian aid to foster post conflict development of the state, is the end of the insurgency without which the re-destruction of re-constructed infrastructures aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering while supporting post conflict development will be a vicious circle.

Conclusion

The research concluded based on each research objectives as presented in the paragraphs below. The impact of the prolonged insurgency in Borno state is manifest in all facets of developmental indices especially infrastructurally with a large number of physical infrastructures worth trillions of naira being destroyed by the insurgency. This directly affected the post conflict development of the state as the infrastructures that are meant to support economic activities towards the post conflict development processes of the state lays in disarray courtesy of the insurgency. The ripple effect of the situation will be massive, and this could only be manifest in the nearest future as a complete generation is placed at risk of losing the grip of the requisite knowledge and skills for effective leadership and development of the state with the spade of infrastructural destruction, especially schools. Also, the prolonged insurgency has impacted the livelihood activities of the affected population which are the activities that boost the economy of the state which is a vital index of the state development in the post conflict. While the aid dependency syndrome has further complicated the situation with a large population of the productive group not willing to take the lead of their lives and engage themselves in productive activities that will generate income for them and thereby contributing to the economic




Figure 1. Respondent opinion on the ongoing humanitarian aid causing any problem to development of Borno State in Post conflict period. Source: Field work.

development of the state.

Humanitarian aid is highly connected to the development of Borno state in the aftermath of the insurgency as such should be taken into cognizance by the government at all levels. Although the prolonged insurgency hinders the development of the state, the humanitarian interventions ongoing in the state must be maximized to ensure that it lays a foundation for effective development of the state in the post conflict. The restriction of movement due to the ongoing fight against the insurgent halted the major commercial activities that contributes to the development of the state; fish business from Baga fish market, cultivation of crops and rearing of livestock; cross-border business of Gamboru-Ngala and Banki among other border markets. Distortion of educational and socio-economic activities across the state also increases the risk to post conflict development of the state. However, humanitarian aid provides different forms of interventions that address cross-cutting issues of such concerns that could be leveraged on to lay a foundation for the post conflict development of the state. Therefore, the strong relationship between humanitarian aid and post conflict development of Borno state necessitated that the government should pay attention to the intervention because of its necessity to effective development of the state after the conflict. Consequently, the study contributed to the body of knowledge as it established that amidst many challenges and concerns associated with humanitarian aid and protracted conflict, the aid is highly connected to the post conflict development as such should not be neglected by the local authorities.

The information gathered from the findings of the

research support the conclusion that humanitarian aid is impactful on post conflict development of Borno State. The interventions provided by the humanitarian aid are in the areas of health (including renovation, reconstruction, equipping and establishing mobile health facilities in addition to provision of the healthcare services); nutrition (supporting to save the lives of malnourished children, pregnant women, lactating mothers and food distribution for affected households); food security and livelihood (conditional cash transfer/distribution, agricultural and economic empowerment); shelter (construction of temporary shelter, distribution of non - food items, reconstruction of houses and other facilities); water sanitation and hygiene (construction of toilet facilities, awareness creation on hygienic behaviors, construction of boreholes and water points among others); education in emergency (enrolment and re-enrolment of children to schools, construction of temporary schools, renovation and reconstruction of school facilities, provision of non-formal educational system to bridge the gaps, vocational skills development among other) and peacebuilding and social cohesion (behaviour change interventions targeted at building peace, reintegration of people associated with arm groups, rehabilitation of ex-combatant, citizens – state engagement activities towards building trust and collaboration among other). All the highlighted areas of the interventions above fit into different indexes of development which means that effective delivery of these interventions will contribute greatly to the indices of development. Thereby laying a good ground for the post conflict development to thrive towards achieving the targeted future development planned by the state. Also,

humanitarian aid has a significant impact on the social and economic livelihood of the people of Borno as it aided the reduction of the internally displaced person (IDPs) from the camp, provides employment for the youths and business opportunity for many business owners who supply goods and services to the aid agencies. This is significant for post conflict development of the state. However, it is also worthy to take into cognizance the significance of the population of study that have a divergent opinion on the positive impact of the humanitarian aid on the social and economic livelihood of the Borno people. This is because the higher population of the study opines that there is a positive impact but the ratio of the population with an opposing opinion (33:62) was large enough to be considered. This implies that the merging between the two opinions was not very wide.

Although the study informed the conclusion that the ongoing humanitarian interventions in Borno state will not cause any problem to the post conflict development of the state, it also called for more attention on the challenges that have potentials to avert this conclusion from standing. The challenges such as lack of synergy, collaboration, coordination, rivalry/competition, and complementarity among the aid agencies and between the aid agencies and the state government. Duplication of interventions; corruption among the aid workers (especially logistic, procurement and human resource units); attacks targeted at the aid workers by the Boko haram group; unhealthy perception of government officials that pitch the people against aid workers; and lack of ownership and sustainability of the intervention were considered as challenges that threatens the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. This implies that if these challenges are not carefully managed by the government who is supposed to take the lead in humanitarian intervention, the prospect of the intervention's contribution to post conflict development might not be achieved. However, the giant stride by the state government in the establishment of the agency for coordination of humanitarian affairs and the development of a strategic plan for the development of the state in post conflict is a step in the direction of addressing this problem if sentimental and malicious factors are put aside.

The humanitarian aid provided an opportunity for development of the state in post conflict if well utilized by the government and the people of the state. If the government will utilize it forces and increase its commitment (backed by actions); enhance supervision of the leadership of the security forces; improve the welfare and motivation of the personnel of the security forces; equip the security actors effectively; take an offensive approach to fighting the Boko haram and take the war to the camps of the insurgency while exploring available options of peacebuilding, the protracted insurgency will be ended. This will provide the ground for full

implementation of developmental strategies which will build on the opportunities provided by the humanitarian aid towards effective development of the state. And this could only be achieved by employing a strategic approach to withdraw from humanitarian aid into early recovery and then post conflict development. But this must be led by the state government hence the importance of the agencies for coordination of humanitarian affairs.

Recommendation

The following are therefore recommended from the study based on the above conclusion;

- i) Government should employ all available options (both military forces and peace and reconciliation approaches) to ensure that the crises and/or on-going conflicts are resolved as soon as possible to avoid prolonging issues that will impact more on the development of the state.
- ii) Since it is established that there is a strong connection between humanitarian intervention and post conflict development, it is therefore necessary that authorities do not neglect humanitarian intervention or create a gap between the aid agencies and the state. There should be strong good coordination and support from the government who is to take the leadership of the intervention and ensure that the interventions are effectively delivered in line with the post conflict development agenda of the state.
- iii) The targeted populations receiving the humanitarian aid should be supported to know that the aid is just temporary as such they should consciously peak up the challenges of regaining their livelihood and economic activities and avoid dependence on the aid.
- iv) The government must support the aid agencies to ensure the acceptance and ownership of the interventions by the people and garner support to the agencies toward sustainability of the interventions. Since the interventions are bedrock for the future development of the state in the aftermath of the conflict, sustainability is necessary, and this could only be guaranteed by the targeted population who received the interventions.
- v) The government must empower the state agency for coordination of humanitarian affair and create a good synergy between the agencies and the Northeast Development Commission (NEDC) to ensure that they work effectively and void of bias and malicious intent in collaborate with aid agencies to coordinate their activities, ensure synergy and avoid duplication of intervention. While managing rivalry and unhealthy competition among actors towards effective delivery of the intervention with the post conflict development of the state in mind.
- vi) The government should key into opportunities provided by the humanitarian aid in the various areas of the interventions which are directly contributing to the

various indices of development and strengthen the impact of the interventions to be more sustainable and build the post conflict development of the state on these opportunities.

vii) Further studies should be carried out to identify strategies that could be adopted to utilize the opportunities provided by humanitarian aid towards post conflict development of the states.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflicts of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Land conflict dynamics in Africa: A critical review on farmer-pastoralist conflict perspectives

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This paper examines the theoretical bases underlying the causes of land conflicts. It involves a critical analysis of various contentions surrounding land nexus violent conflicts with particular attention to farmer-pastoralist conflicts. The drive for this examination is more on a comparison of causes between such conflicts in varying contexts of African. The major aim is to broaden the understanding about the nature of these conflicts with the prospect of setting grounds for scholars and policy makers for reviewing and crafting relevant intervening measures. The paper draws on debates and literature on farmer-pastoralist conflict to develop insights into their dynamics. This aims at making stakeholders informed of the existing gaps in research and underlying causes that could be capitalized on in devising relevant mitigating measures. The review shows that the uncontrolled interaction of the supply; demand and structural induced aspects contribute to the state of inequality, competition, and conflicts among land users. This situation is found to be aggravated by the social and political conditions surrounding the causes and governance of natural resources, with typical scenario of the changing policies of land tenure that have exacerbated increasing land grabbing and tenure insecurities. The paper recommends the need for revisiting the formal and informal structures that governs resource distribution in a bid to alleviate existing land- access inequalities and conflicts.

Key words: Conflicts, farmers, pastoralists, resource conflicts, competition, environmental scarcity, structural scarcity, resource degradation.

INTRODUCTION

There have been considerable concerns by scholars in peace and conflict studies to establish the meaning of the conflict phenomenon ever since the 1950s (Azar, 2015). This concern came as a result of realizing that conflict is an inevitable part of social life happening between one individual and another, individuals and societies or one state and another as they interact in a given environment (Umbreit, 1995; Mayer, 2012; Azar, 2015; Boulding, 2015). As such there has been varying experiences and conceptualizations of conflict.

Mayer (2012:3) perceives conflict as “a feeling, a disagreement, and a real or perceived incompatibility of interests, a product of inconsistent world views, or a set of behaviour”. Wallenstein (2012) defines it as a behavioural situation arising from disagreement on how to pursue certain goals, interests or needs between two or more parties. To him, conflict is nothing more than a result of incompatible interests that cannot be reconciled by the few available resources.

In other words, scarcity of resources is the main drive

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for competing interests among parties. In a more robust explanation, Boulding (2015:24) is of the opinion that, conflict is “a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.” In this case, conflict seems to originate from an instinct driving one to fulfil self-desires even if doing so may jeopardize opportunities for others to fulfil the same. Thus, the seeming broader consensus is that conflicts occur when there are incompatible interests and either party struggles to gain either through conciliation or at the expense of the other.

Following this assumption, several conflict resolution initiatives have been focusing on analysis of the incompatibility of interests as a step for understanding the root cause of the conflicts and courses of action towards peace building. The underlying assumption has been that “incompatibility appears to be a key to the existence of conflict” (Wallenstein, 2012:15). Nevertheless, literature has suggested a number of other factors that have been causing social conflict in many parts of the world. Nwokolo (2013:12) outlines these factors among others as “ethnicity, inequality and social exclusion. This is because conflict and violence just like other social processes can seldom be explained by a single cause and that the primary determining cause of social change is impossible to prove; instead, social change tends to represent a dynamic interaction of numerous factors over time.”

As part of the broader conflicts, natural resource conflicts have been a subject of contention in recent decades as well. This is because resource conflicts have been associated with two major outcomes impacting on the society in question: first, resource conflicts can be a threat to the security and livelihood of human beings and the community at large as they are often associated with violence (Mbah et al., 2021). Second, resource conflicts may act as the engine of social change through which conflict-interest relationships in the community can be transformed into new forms (Rutten and Mwangi, 2014).

In this regard, it is necessary to critically examine the dynamics surrounding the resource-conflict relationship, especially if we are to understand the real causes in their entirety and decide the appropriate course of action for resolution and peace building initiatives. This is because resource-related conflicts are believed to have other causes beyond competing interests, and this has made them even more violent and complex (Rutten and Mwangi 2014). For instance, while referring to resource conflicts in African dry land, Pavanello and Scott-Villiers (2013:1) have emphasized that, “it is impractical to single out a primary cause and drivers: indeed, conflicts that may appear limited and localized to pastoralist dryland area may be fuelled by drivers in institutional, political-economic and social spheres operating at national, regional and even global levels.” This underscores the complexity of natural resource conflicts.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This paper is based on critical examination of debates and literature on farmer-pastoralist conflict dynamics, with the aim of developing insights into their dynamics and underlying causes. Sources contacted include journal articles and eBooks/books accessed through Google search, Google scholar search, academia.edu search, summon search and the Library of the University of Bradford. Cases of these conflicts from different regions of African have critically been reviewed and analytically presented in the paper, the aim being to enhance broader understanding of the socio-political dynamics surrounding causes and impacts of these conflicts. Most importantly, environmental security and political ecology narratives have been reviewed to enhance understanding of how some elements of environmental scarcity (degradation) and socio-political structures interact to create resource scarcity, access inequalities and ultimately conflicts. This aims at unveiling existing gaps in research and underlying causes about farmer-pastoralist conflicts to make stakeholders fully informed as they think and decide about policies and strategies they should devise to alleviate the severity and impacts of the conflicts in question.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overview of land conflicts

As a subset of natural resource conflicts, land conflicts have been among the major sources of complex violent conflicts that have disrupted livelihoods in many African countries (Mbah et al., 2021). For example, in the countries of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan) and East Africa (Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya), land conflict involving farmers and pastoralists has led to a number of devastating effects including human insecurity and poor livelihood (Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2013:3). Literature suggests that “most of these conflicts are rooted in the inability of governments to manage the conflicting legacies bequeathed by the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence periods, and the determination of governments and political elites to ensure effective grip over the ownership and control of land” (Alao, 2007:64; Petersen, 2017). Yet, recent development in the literature reveals aspects of “poverty, climate change, political instability and weak governance and justice systems” (Mbah et al., 2021: 5225) as other factors contribution to the escalation of land conflicts among other complex and multi-layered causes.

In the broadest sense land is considered to be “the most important natural resource in Africa” (Alao 2007:63; Beck and Bjerger, 2017). Yet, other literatures have gone further calling it to be the dearest resource on the globe as without it there would be no existence of any nation (Home, 2021). Proponents of this view argue that the importance of land is not only based on economic value through which individuals derive their livelihood (Beck and Bjerger, 2017) but also to the spiritual and socio-political value attached to it (Alao, 2007; Mwamfupe, 2015), and that because of this it has recently become a pro-poor agenda (Home, 2021) in the global platforms. Its economic significance for livelihoods arises from the fact

that the majority of people depend on land for agricultural activities and livestock keeping for food and other livelihood amenities (Beck and Bjerge, 2017; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015).

As time goes on, land is becoming an increasingly scarce resource. The exponential increase in population and on-going rapid urbanization in developing countries are making demand for land even higher (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015; Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016; Home, 2021). Obviously, the increase in population and urbanization trends has always been inversely proportional to the land supply per person because land is a fixed asset which cannot easily be increased by natural means. This is now contributing to changes in land use plans that are hampering customary land use and ownership rights. Land previously used for agriculture and livestock keeping has been reallocated for new settlement in order to accommodate the ever-increasing population and supporting infrastructures in urban and peri urban areas. These circumstances force crop farmers and livestock keepers to interact on a confined amount of land from which they could derive their livelihoods. Ultimately, one of the consequences emanating from such an interaction is the violent conflicts among the two groups with diverse interests in a bid to compete for the few resources at their disposal. The ultimate impact is “low agricultural and livestock productivity, low standard of living and food insecurity” (Naab et al., 2013:257).

Empirical evidence shows that, recent policy changes allowing land grabbing and commercialization in Africa have raised land values (Boone, 2017; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). This is creating stiff competition among rural societies whose livelihoods depend on agricultural activities (Ngin and Verkoren, 2015; Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016).

This imbalance in demand and supply of land is associated with conflicts precipitated by scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999). Acquisition of large areas of land for private commercial investments leads to a corresponding decrease in land predominantly used for smallholder agriculture and pastoralism. Under such circumstances land undergoes degradation emanating from intensive farming and grazing. This leads to depletion of arable land and other resources on it such as pasture and water and hence competition between opposing land user groups, particularly crop farmers and pastoralists.

Although a significant number of scholars acknowledge the contribution of land scarcity to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, the fact that some possess different views cannot be ignored. Bernauer et al. (2012) raise questions on the direct role of land scarcity in violent conflicts. They argue that human beings can manipulate the environment through technology application and use of well-established institutions to enhance fair distribution of scarce resources. One example of the application of technology is the construction of

water dams, deep wells, and desalinization of sea water to enable reliable supply of fresh water for agricultural and livestock keeping activities. It should however be noted that those resources could only be shared harmoniously among users if the institutions responsible for resource governance adopt best practices of resource management. These arguments however leave several unanswered questions as to what is possible for farmers and pastoralist communities in developing countries where technology and institutional governance are claimed to be of poor quality.

According to Benjaminsen and Boubacar (2021), farmer-herder conflicts over scarce resources are increased by poor governance and corruption surrounding social, state and political institutions. Because of that, these institutions lack moral authority to make fair and rational decisions regarding natural resource use and conflicts. Benjaminsen adds that pastoralists seem to be economically powerful and therefore able to influence decisions through “bribing officials working in the local government, police and the judiciary”. One of the effects of such corruption is the biased decisions that override justice, which eventually intensify grievances among actors of the weaker side. As Benjaminsen et al. (2009: 441) argues, such a situation “results in actors trying to solve problems through violence”. These arguments therefore tell us that, clear understanding of the land scarcity and violent conflict relationship needs a detailed analysis of the multidimensional factors, within the context in which such conflicts occur.

The environmental scarcity narrative

As narrated in the previous sections, the importance of renewable natural resources for rural livelihood transformation is widely recognized (Malley et al., 2008; Ratner et al., 2013). This is because the majority of rural people in many developing countries are farmers and pastoralists who depend entirely on renewable resources for crop farming and livestock keeping. Examples of these resources according to Ratner et al. (2013:184) are “land, water, fisheries and forests”. Farmers and pastoralists rely heavily on these resources, famously known as “common pool resources” for their agriculture and livestock keeping respectively. Evidence from literature shows; that these resources are becoming scarcer with time. “Scarcity is the result of environmental degradation and most observers regard degradation as the result of land-use systems becoming maladapted because of population growth, technical inadequacies when dealing with soil erosion, and high level of exploitation of soil nutrients” (De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2005:57). They emphasized that, these are kinds of environmental changes are largely influenced by human activities when they interact with the environment to make their living. They also argue that environmental

change has recently been a global concern due to its association with resource scarcity especially in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

In the Sahel region for instance, discourses on land degradation and desertification led to the formulation of the “United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1994” (Andersson et al., 2011:300). Interestingly, is the emphasis by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and AlGore (the previous US vice president) on aspects of land degradation and desertification as sources of scarcity and conflicts in the region above (Benjaminsen and Boubacar, 2021). This was after the realization that, if the situation was not under control, crop farming and livestock keeping activities that supported the livelihoods of the majority in the region would be in jeopardy. As Koubi et al. (2014) argue, inadequate access to land resources has a corresponding effect on the livelihood security of the people.

At the same time the environmental scarcity and resource conflicts relationship has gained prominence in several scholarly debates. While some relate scarcity of natural resources with an increasing number of violent conflicts, others argue that empirical evidence relating natural resource scarcity to direct conflicts is yet to be established. To get an insight into this debate, two groups of theorists are critically examined. These are Neo-Malthusians who believe in the environmental scarcity role in violent conflicts and Cornucopians who are “resource optimists” (Bernauer et al., 2012). In this discussion I refer to Thomas Homer-Dixon as a representative of Neo-Malthusian views.

Representing Neo-Malthusians views, Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that, there is a direct relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflicts. His claim is based on the fact that, as scarcity of resources increases, so does the likelihood of conflict. He suggests three main reasons: (1) “supply induced scarcity”, which is a function of reduced natural resource quality and quantity, (2) “demand induced scarcity”, which is a function of increased consumption due to exponential increase of population, and (3) “structural scarcity” - attributed to uneven distribution of available resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999:48; De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2005; Benjaminsen and Boubacar, 2021). To enhance a thorough conceptualization of these contentions, each of these factors is discussed separately though at times they may overlap with each other as it is impossible to separate them completely.

Supply induced scarcity

Building his argument on “supply induced scarcity” Homer-Dixon argues that such scarcity emanates from degraded land that leads to reduced quality and quantity. As already discussed above, unsustainable land use

practices and other human induced factors are believed to cause this reduction in land quality (Dejene et al., 1997; Lestrelin, 2010).

According to Homer-Dixon, there is clear evidence showing depletion of these resources through a number of factors such as degradation and overpopulation. Land degradation and depletion for example have had devastating consequences in countries like Philippines forcing migration to steep slopes that are not suitable for ordinary human survival (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Ja’afar-Furo et al., 2018). As land degrades, people are forced to move; often to land that is less productive. As such, families find it more difficult to grow enough food to support them. Likewise, livestock keepers lack enough pasture for their animals. As a result, their ability to sustain their living through pastoralism is seriously reduced. Giving more examples, Homer-Dixon argues that, land depletion in South Africa has forced people to migrate into overpopulated squatter areas that are persistently prone to environmental hazards such as floods and communicable diseases. Such environments reduce their opportunities to engage in various income generating activities in order to enhance their livelihood. As a result they frequently enter into conflicts with settlers occupying large areas of land (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Land degradation has had serious consequences in the rural areas of most developing countries (Ja’afar-Furo et al., 2018; Lestrelin, 2010). This is because communities rely heavily on natural resources for their livelihood. At the same time degraded land is unable to produce enough to support communities on a sustainable base as natural resources are depreciating faster than they can be regenerated. Among the coping strategies for communities such as pastoralists has been seasonal movement from areas of perceived pasture and water scarcity to areas where those resources are available. Fabusoro and Sodiya (2011) describe the case of Fulani pastoralists’ migration to Yoruba land in Nigeria, associating it with land degradation among other factors. Referring to nomadic livestock keeping, they continue: “This mode of livestock production and management is becoming increasingly difficult or nearly impossible due to lack of access to land in the wake of degrading grazing resources, conflict as a result of farm encroachment and lack of policy support to protect grazing routes. These, among other factors, occasioned the migration of Fulani pastoralists from their traditional habitation in northern and central Nigeria” (Fabusoro and Sodiya, 2011:54).

Tanzania has had similar consequences of land degradation as well. As argued by (Mbonile, 2005), degradation of traditional grazing land has caused movement of pastoralists from other parts of the country to wet lands such as the Pangani river basin where they could have sustainable access to pasture and water for their livestock. He also argues that the migration involved farmers as well as they were also after fertile and moist land for crop farming. As a result, the increased number

of livestock and crop farming activities intensified the competition for land and water. This competition has resulted in “severe conflict between farmers and pastoralists” (Mbonile, 2005:49). Similar trends of migration and subsequent effects are reported in Usangu plains in Mbeya region, Bagamoyo in coast region and Kilosa district (Mbonile, 2005:48; Benjaminsen et al., 2009). Such movements according to Homer-Dixon have been a source of livelihood conflicts between new arrivals and the natives.

Critics of these views argue that land degradation cannot cause human livelihood insecurity as mechanisms to control it can be enhanced. According to Dejene et al. (1997), degraded land can be replenished by either or all of the following approaches. First, the availability of technology can revitalize degraded land. Such an approach attaches importance to the use of locally available technologies in collaboration with experts and land users. To this effect Fairhead and Scoones (2005) give examples where fertilizer, crop residues, and best farming practices on different landscapes can be used to enhance soil fertility. Second is the populist approach which attaches the importance of using traditional knowledge emanated among the local land users themselves. Third is a hybrid of “classical and populist” ideas. It insists on the interplay of technology and empowerment in land degradation control. This means that training on new measures to contain land degradation should be conducted as well as using local knowledge.

Despite these suggestions for alternative means through which land degradation could be controlled, there is still evidence of recurring conflicts. This signifies the need for analysing the context through which these conflicts occur. Analysis should therefore seek to address questions of whether the institutions governing land use plans are strong enough for good land governance.

Demand induced scarcity

Demand induced scarcity has been conceptualized as scarcity precipitated by increased consumption brought about by increasing population (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Indeed, the increase in population triggers a corresponding increase in the need for more land from which people derive their basic necessities of life (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Alam, 2008; Kangalawe and Lyimo, 2010; Link et al., 2015). This may cause intensive use of land, an action that leads to reduced quality and quantity unless sustainable land use practices are adopted. As Urdal (2005:418) argues, “countries with rapidly growing populations will experience degradation and scarcity of natural resources such as cropland, fresh water, forests, and fisheries increasing the risk of violent conflicts over scarce resources”. These resources are necessary for the survival of human beings as they depend on them for food, drinking water and other livelihood amenities.

Shortage or depletion will mean loss of life or sickness for the population. Likewise, as population increases, a corresponding demand for land for food production and space for living increases which ultimately has a negative impact on per capita income and consequently economic development (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Alam, 2008; Kangalawe and Lyimo, 2010; Link et al., 2015).

The result increased stress on the common pool of resources leading to degradation and depletion and hence the tragedy of commons (Hardin, 1968) cited in (Moritz et al., 2013). As natural resource degradation and depletion threatens human security and survival, people tend to migrate to other places as an adapting mechanism (Alam, 2008). Focusing on the effects of migration, Reuven says:

“The arrival of environmental migrants can burden the economic and resource base of the receiving area, promoting native–migrant contest over resources. Pressures are expected to rise with the number of migrants and residents, particularly when resources are scarce in the receiving area and property rights are underdeveloped. The excess demand for resources may also generate lateral pressure, expansion of economic and political activities beyond the region's or state's borders in order to acquire resources, which increases the risk of conflict” (Reuveny, 2007:659).

The study done in Tanzania by Mbonile (2005) shows that there has been an intensive migration of farmers and livestock keepers from highlands to lowlands close to water sources. He argues that increased migration has led to a corresponding increase of population and livestock as well. This has led to frequent conflict over land and water between farmers and pastoralists. In relation to the Pangani water basin, Mbonile continues:

“The conflict between livestock keepers and farmers in the Pangani basin started in early 1950 when the basin experienced the in-migration of pastoralists from the southern regions and farmers from the highlands. The pressure of pastoralists on the basin became more serious after independence in 1961 simply because land formally reserved from pastoralists was no longer protected. The average in-migration alone was about 3000 cattle per year. Many in-migrants decided to settle in existing villages while others started villages of their own. As a result several new villages have been formed even in areas that were for livestock and this interrupted the transhumance of livestock keepers” (Mbonile, 2005: : 49).

Empirical evidence also indicates that, farmer-pastoralist conflicts in Kilosa district of Tanzania started after the influx of Maasai pastoralists with large herds of livestock in 1968 (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). This followed policy and socio-economic changes that undermined the traditional form of livestock keeping that was

characterized by seasonal movement of herds across the Maasai land. Indeed, the introduced changes marginalized Maasai pastoralists, who responded by moving to other areas where they would have access to alternative grazing land; in this case in Kilosa district. As Maasai pastoralists arrived, coupled with other intervening factors such as land alienation for sisal estates, in-migration of people searching for jobs in sisal estates and expansion of Mikumi national park, the increase in people and livestock led to pressure on land resources (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). As a result the district has been experiencing stiff competition that in some cases leads to bloody clashes between farmer and pastoralists groups.

Echoing Malthusian views on the effect of population growth on human insecurity, cornucopians argue that there is a direct connection between population growth and resource scarcity and consequently poor economic development but on temporary bases (Bernauer et al., 2012). They challenge the possibility of violent conflicts resulting from the influence of population pressure on natural resources because the use of technology can increase the size of the resource pie. They give examples of where application of technology can enhance ground water extraction and purification for use in supplementation or amid the scarcity of natural waters. Indeed, investing in technology to produce intermediate goods that can be consumed and exchanged through markets would in a way enhance human adaptation to the environment with a dwindling natural resource. For this case they embrace population growth for economic gains (Bretschger, 2013) as it sets favourable ground for reliable sources of labour and markets.

They argue that the problem of resource scarcity can be curbed through institutions that would set mechanisms for fair distribution of both resources and power within the community. However, the extent to which they are able to buffer communities from the adverse effects of resource scarcity depends on the quality of the institutions themselves. As Homer-Dixon (1999:32) put it, “better institutions, policies, and technologies can directly boost the physical availability of resources and reduce total resource demand”. For instance, “the development and distribution of new grains adapted for dry climates and eroded soils, of alternative cooking technologies to compensate for the loss of firewood, and of water conservation technologies depend on an intricate and stable system of markets, legal regimes, financial agencies and educational and research institutions” (Homer-Dixon, 1994:17). In this way grievances leading to conflicts can be largely minimized. Based on this understanding it could be suggested that there are several other factors interacting with perceived scarcity for violent conflicts to happen (Bernauer et al., 2012). They deny the possibility that resource scarcity alone can be the main cause of conflicts.

These arguments testify the need for empirical evidence

on the contribution of increased population to farming and grazing land scarcity through a multidimensional perspective. This involves answering questions such as: (1) has there been evidence of in-migration of people and livestock within the district? (2) Have there been any land conflicts before in-migration of people and livestock? (3) What are the politics surrounding land use and distribution? (4) Does land resource governance meet perceived farmers and pastoralists interests? (5) Is there infrastructure such as dams, cattle dips to support livestock keeping? Answers to these questions will determine the extent to which population increase leads to land scarcity and consequently conflict.

Structure induced scarcity

Structure induced scarcities occur when resources are not distributed equally among members of the society or community (Homer-Dixon, 1999). This inequality in resource distribution is nurtured by institutional systems and “ethnic relations” having their “roots from colonial period” (Homer-Dixon, 1994:15). Worse, the existing imbalance in natural resource distribution may relate to external factors. Homer-Dixon (1994) identifies some of these factors as the created poverty trap and national debt in developing countries. He argues,-

“The imbalance is frequently sustained and reinforced by international economic relations that trap developing countries into dependence on a few raw materials exports. It can also be reinforced by heavy external debts that encourage countries to use their most productive environmental resources – such as their croplands and forests - to generate hard currency rather than to support the most impoverished segments of their populations” (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 15).

The nature of scarcity when alone or in combination with other sources of scarcities causes social and economic hazards such as “constrained agriculture and economic productivity, increased migration, sharper social segmentation, and disrupted institutions” (Homer-Dixon, 1999:52; Benjaminsen and Boubacar, 2021), creating a potential for violent conflicts. To get a wider view on how structure induces resource conflicts, I look into the politics surrounding land ownership and land grabbing.

The interaction of supply, demand, and structure induced scarcities

Research evidence indicates that, often, supply, demand and structural induced scarcities do interact, leading to two kinds of social processes known as “resource capture” and “ecological marginalization” (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Homer-Dixon defines

resource capture as a situation when the available resources face great pressure from high demand of the increasing population. When this happens, some segments of the society especially those in the centre of institutions allocate a greater proportion of scarce resources to themselves at the expense of the majority who are socially weak (Homer-Dixon, 1999). He adds that such groups of powerful elites enable this to happen by skewing policies and laws governing resource distribution in their favour to the detriment of the marginalized groups within the society. This weakens institutional responses to social grievances and increases the risk of violent conflicts (Bernauer et al., 2012:2).

Homer-Dixon (1999:73) defines ecological marginalization, as a situation “when unequal resource access joins with population growth to cause migrations to regions that are ecologically fragile, such as steep slopes, areas at risk of desertification, tropical rainforests and peri-urban squatter settlements”. Shifting to these areas causes even more land degradation and depletion because of population increase that leads to a corresponding unsustainable intensive land use. As such the land becomes unfit for crop farming and livestock keeping hence jeopardizing human livelihood security. The result has often been competition and violent conflicts over productive land resource. In the Philippines for example, such livelihood insecurity “spurred insurgence and rebellion”(Homer-Dixon, 1999:77). Contentions surrounding structural scarcity however, need detailed analysis, especially under particular contextual factors. To enhance this, the author look into the politics surrounding the relationship between structural scarcity and land tenure on one hand and then structural scarcity and land grabbing on the other hand.

Structural scarcity and land tenure

The current mode of land accessibility and tenure security for local populations in developing countries is full of uncertainties. Scholars associate this insecurity with the high value attached to it that has forced land reforms to allow private ownership for commercial investment purposes (Boone, 2017; Soeters et al., 2017; Matondi et al., 2011; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). This has contravened the historical customary land tenure system that has been in practice from the pre-colonial era to as far as the early 1980s and allowed a communal mode of ownership of common pool resources such as land, forests and water. The current mode of access to customary land has created an opportunity for groups that are politically and economically powerful to have access to secure land tenure at the expense of the weaker groups who are basically farmers and pastoralists (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015).

In one of their studies in Ghana, Soeters et al. (2017) argue that West African farmers and pastoralists enter

into frequent conflicts as result of lack of tenure security aggravated by structural changes that have accommodated private modes of land ownership, foster agricultural modernization agenda and injection of private capital in farm expansion.

This has limited the common property mode of utilization of land that granted freedom to different user groups including farmers and pastoralists (Kuusaana and Bukari 2015). Introduction of legally binding boundaries to privately owned land has led to restricted access to pasture and water for livestock. The situation in many cases precipitates conflicts between famers and pastoralists (Soeters et al., 2017).

Tanzania has been undertaking similar structural reforms on land tenure and ownership since the 1980s. These reforms, that led to new policies regarding land use and governance, were aimed at tenure security and conflict reduction among all land user groups (Askew et al., 2013; Biddulph, 2018). Current policies and legislation derive their origin from a land act enacted in 1999 which aimed to enhance land governance through local decentralized structures that would be responsible for land governance and conflicts management (Biddulph, 2018; Pedersen, 2016). Despite this good intention, debate on persistent tenure insecurity and conflicts continues. For example, the new policies have led to eviction of pastoralists from their traditional grazing lands in Arusha and Manyara regions in favour of hunting firms (Bluwstein et al., 2018; Askew et al. 2013) and National Agriculture and Food Cooperation (NAFCO) ((Bluwstein, 2018) despite legal recognition of their village lands. Sometimes transfer of ownership of land does not follow the prescribed legal procedure due to corrupt office bearers trusted to oversee the process. Such behaviour deprives local farmers and pastoralists from their traditional ownership rights. These policies seem to marginalize the minority groups in terms of land ownership and security. Neo-Malthusians associate this with structural scarcity that leads to a reduction of the resource pie as a result of unfair land allocation. The reduced land size has actually contributed to fierce competition between farmers and pastoralists in Arusha and Manyara regions (Askew et al., 2013).

There are claims that pastoralists are the groups most vulnerable to these policies as in most cases they discourage traditional ways of livestock keeping. They emphasize reduction of the herd size to pave the way for a sedentary mode of pastoralism. At times, implementation of these policies involves forced migration of pastoralists by state law enforcement organs. As Askew et al. (2013:123) reports,- “one of the worst cases of state-led oppression of pastoralists was the 2006 eviction of approximately 1000 pastoralist households in the Ihefu valley of southern Tanzania. The evictions were rationalized via the claim that pastoralists were responsible for significant environmental degradation”. This has created a sense of anti-pastoralism

among policy makers and the general public regardless of the fact that pastoralism's contribution to Tanzanian GDP is around 7.4% (URT, 2015). In cases of competition or conflict farmers are always favoured by government officials particularly in Kilosa district (Benjaminsen et al., 2009:440).

Revealing how structural induced scarcity induces marginalization of the weaker sides of society, Askew argues, "discrimination against and ridicule of pastoralists and other indigenous minorities by the authorities and the press is taking institutional form in legislation and judicial precedents that undermine and devalue the livelihood, human rights and economic contributions of indigenous communities who are viewed as backward by many in positions of power" (Askew et al., 2013:123). He emphasizes that their lawsuits against deprivation of land rights always end up in failure and disappointment. Some examples are: the Maasai pastoralists of Kenya who lost a lawsuit of 1913 in the high court and the 2010 lawsuit against eviction of Maasai pastoralists from Loliondo-Northern Tanzania which they lost (Askew et al., 2013). As such, according to Askew, a sense of paranoia is created among pastoralists against demanding their rights through courts.

Thus, from the structurally induced scarcity point of view and based on the claims above, one would conclude that, indeed the nature of resource distribution may create land scarcity. The preceding arguments signify a need to define scarcity based on a particular context. This means that, even if the available land area is very small because of high population, good policies and responsible institutions can reduce the intensity of scarcity through fair and just land governance and distribution. However, the reality depends on the particular context across regions. In the same line of thinking (Peters, 2008) argues that it is not land scarcity that matters, rather the politics surrounding land governance and distribution. He refers to the Kwaja farmers and Fulbe pastoralists of Cameroon where unjust policies led to conflicts. He further argues that what causes conflict is actually confusion over "how different resources should be managed, who has what responsibilities and duties, and who has what authority to locate rights and resolve conflicts" (Peters, 2008:633). He argues that conflicts become a result of competition over the authority that governs land allocation through different machineries as opposed to competition over scarcity.

Structural scarcity and land grabbing

Literature suggests that land grabbing is increasingly changing forms of land access and ownership in African continent (Soeters et al., 2017; Matondi et al., 2011). This is due to the recent incidence of hiked oil and food prices in the global markets that jeopardize energy and food security. As argued by Matondi et al. (2011:1), the

situation "results in a global push for bio fuels from various agricultural feed stocks, as well as for land in order to enhance food production and food security". In a bid to support the global concern for energy and food security, developing nations moved for structural land reforms to accommodate private land ownership under the financial assistance of the World Bank and other international financial institutions (Collins and Mitchell, 2018; Matondi et al., 2011; Pedersen, 2016).

This move has however been strongly resisted by local landowners across developing nations as the exercise seems to undermine local land ownership rights. As such, the resistance has "affected moral, economic, and political relations between and within nations, classes and communities both inside and outside Africa" (Matondi et al., 2011:1). Despite this and while motivated with promises of "economic development from foreign investors and technological innovations in agriculture" leaders of developing nations formulate policies that embrace the interests of investors while ignoring protection of indigenous interests on land access and ownership rights (Matondi et al., 2011:14). Equally, as they argue, they are also often motivated with the need to enhance their (African policy makers) unique opportunity for land capture.

Some scholars are concerned that the current push ultimately displaces smallholder farmers from their customary owned land.

As land grabbing intensifies farmers continue to suffer. A significant part of their land is taken by large multinational companies without their consent or through terms that are not favourable to them (Soeters et al., 2017; Collins and Mitchell, 2018; Matondi et al., 2011). Literature suggests that in most cases it is the government that enters into bilateral agreement with the investors without thorough involvement of native land stakeholders who are smallholder farmers and pastoralists (Matondi et al., 2011). This has been possible due to the ability of large companies to influence the implementation of policies to their advantage. In this way policies are implemented in ways that undermine indigenous land access and ownership rights, encourage land grabbing as a source of land scarcity. Homer-Dixon identifies this scenario as structural scarcity because policies seem to embrace classes (the haves and the have nots in terms of wealth and political power) in land distribution and ownership. Referring to his resource pie metaphor, he argues that if there is an inequality in land access due to skewed policies majority who are for this case farmer and pastoralists are confined to a small area of land. This has often been the source of competition between these two groups in a bid to secure their livelihood. The result has often been migration, forced eviction and violent conflicts particularly between farmers and pastoralists or with other land user groups.

Referring to a Tanzanian case, Nelson argues that, "there is nevertheless a growing sense of pervasive land

grabs encroaching on local rights, marginalizing rural farmers and pastoralists who depend on land, water and other natural resources, and further concentrating wealth and assets in the hands of political and economic elites” (Nelson, 2012:2).

This is happening following the land reforms that came with both the land act of 1999 and village land act of 1999. These acts aimed to establish legal procedures for land governance and distribution that would recognize customary land ownership rights among communities (Collins and Mitchell, 2018). Contrary to this, farmers and pastoralists have consistently been denied their rights to land ownership and hence been forced to live in marginal areas. For example, Nelson reports that, in 2009, Maasai communities were forcibly evicted by the government from their traditional land in Loriondo in favour of “Ortello Business Corporation (OBC)”, a famous hunting company from United Arab Emirates. This move happened despite the claim by the then Loriondo member of parliament that the government’s step “ignored the empirical reality that the communities in Loriondo had clear rights to these lands under the Village Land Act, including past title deeds as well as other documentations” (Nelson et al., 2012:14). This indicates that, either laws or policies governing land access and ownership favour politically and economically powerful individuals to the detriment of the poor, or there are deficiencies in good governance. It is therefore the intention of this study to establish empirical evidence on the contradiction between policies that claim to protect communities’ customary land ownership rights and the on-going wave of land grabbing which seems to ignore those rights.

Socio-political context and farmer-pastoralist conflicts nexus

Historically farmers and pastoralists have existed side by side depending on each other for a number of things such as grazing on cropland during the off season while fertilizing land by animal droppings (Moritz, 2006; 2009; 2010). Pastoralists benefited by feeding their flocks on harvested cropland and buying food from farmers, while farmers benefited through added soil nutrients from animal droppings, milk, meat and other cattle by products (Moritz 2006; 2010). The nature of the relationship seems to have changed as a result of population growth that demanded more land for settlement and crop farming (Fratkin 1997; Moritz 2006) and recent policy changes that saw extensive land grabbing for commercial farming and other investments (Bluwstein et al., 2018; Collins and Mitchell, 2018; Matondi et al., 2011). These changes together led to encroachment on the land initially used for communal livestock grazing, and hence intensified competition and animosity between farmers and pastoralists (Moritz, 2006).

Referring to the West African case, (Mbah et al., 2021; Moritz, 2006; 2010) argues that empirical evidence indicates frequent escalation of bloody conflicts over dwindling land resources between these two groups in many parts of West Africa. Moritz in this case adds that, such conflicts in most cases undergo mutations that witness, initial land conflicts turning into ethnic, secular or political conflict. The point of departure here will therefore be asking ourselves as to why do these conflicts undergo mutation? Why do they keep on escalating? What are the real causes of these conflicts? Can land scarcity alone cause violent conflict?

Referring to the context that proliferates in these conflicts (Moritz, 2006) gives examples of Nigeria and Cameroon. He argues that farmer pastoralist conflicts in these areas are potentially fuelled by intervening religious and political factors. This scenario has clearly been narrated by Malthusians that, under intense resource scarcity, grievances increase, causing individuals’ mobilization into groups with ethnic and/or religious sentiments that would cause them to come up with a more organized protest or violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Urdal, 2005; Moritz, 2006). What comes out of this “does not only have a direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of those involved in the conflict, but they are also disrupting and threatening the sustainability of agricultural and pastoral production systems” (Moritz, 2006; 2010). One of the deadly conflicts reported by Moritz happened in 2004 and involved expulsion of massive numbers of Fulbe pastoralists from their traditional land in Nigeria to Cameroon. Moritz (2006) states that, unlike other countries like Somalia, Sudan and the East African countries, farmer-pastoralist conflicts in West Africa rarely involve the use of firearms (Moritz, 2006). This is unlike Tanzania where empirical evidence on farmer-pastoralist conflict taking a religious course are yet to be established but in most cases traditional weapons such as spears, bow and arrows are used against the opposite side causing fatalities (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). However, evidence shows that there is more behind farmer-pastoralist resource conflict in Tanzania.

Research findings show that, context matters when analysing nature of land conflicts as in the Cameroon and Burkina Faso cases. A study by Dafinger and Pelican (2006) shows that Fulbe agro-pastoralists integrate peacefully with farming communities unlike Fulbe pastoralists on the Cameroon side where incidences of violent clashes with farmers exist. Explaining the cause for such differences from land use and legal frameworks the authors argue that:

“Shared use of land and land resources such as water holes, arable fields, and pasture encourages integration through permanent low level conflicts, whereas a divided landscape and allocation of exclusive land titles increases the potential for violent conflicts” (Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 128).

This means that land conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in the two countries are shaped by their contextual land use and legal frameworks. As argued by (Dafinger and Pelican 2006), "In Burkina Faso, the historical and political setting supports an ideology of shared landscape, while in North West Cameroon, the colonial and post-colonial legislations promotes the division of resources along socio-economic categories" (Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 128).

In Tanzania, incidences of farmer-pastoralist conflicts are common. Although most of these conflicts surface as scarce resource conflicts in the first instance, scholars urge that a careful analysis must be done to identify the underlying hidden factors. It is really easy to acknowledge them as land resource conflicts because what we see is the act of livestock feeding on farmer's crops, livestock routes heading to water points blocked by farms and grazing lands converted into cropland (Mbonile 2005; Moritz 2006) while in actual sense there are underlying factors. For example, literature suggests that government initiatives to alienate land from Barabaig pastoralists of Hanang district and Maasai pastoralists of the northern part of Tanzania for wheat plantations and ranches respectively caused devastating effects on the traditional pastoral system (Kajembe et al., 2003). These initiatives involved total eviction of many pastoralists from their traditional designated areas to other areas where they eventually entered into conflicts with farmers. We can see that one of the underlying factors here is the government action of land alienation. Scarcity conflicts in this case depend on other underlying factors and the context in which the conflicts happen. Emphasizing this argument Moritz argues that; "The focus on the contexts and dynamics of farmer herder conflicts allows us to examine why conflicts are more likely to occur in some contexts than others, how they evolve over time, and why some are relatively easily resolved and others escalate" (Moritz, 2006:4). This implies that it is not easy to generalize on the nature of land conflicts across the region, and therefore approaching such studies from a case study perspective seems to be relevant.

As we have already seen in the preceding sections, there is lots of evidence linking farmer-pastoralists conflicts with competition for scarce resources (Mbah et al., 2021; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Moritz, 2006) in line with Malthusian thinking. However this view has attracted a number of criticisms from scholars of varying disciplines such as political ecologists who consider the environmental scarcity and conflict relationship as a simple metaphor that cannot describe the full reality (Peluso and Watts, 2001: in Moritz, 2006) in the current dynamic social and political environment. Instead, they pose a distinct view that "the environment is simply the arena in which social, political, and economic conflicts between different actors are played out" (Moritz, 2006:3).

This perspective indicates that there must be a number of intervening factors for environmental scarcity to cause

violent conflicts.

Conclusion

The paper has reviewed the theoretical overview of land resource conflicts, particularly factors underlying land conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. The paper indicates that the causes of these conflicts are numerous and complex.

Most of these factors seem to have been structurally motivated or contribute to structural scarcity which in most cases becomes a source of grievances and violent conflicts. This implies that there is an interlinkage between what manifests to be the factors causing conflicts and the social and political structures of the society. For instance, critical examination of the environmental scarcity narrative has revealed that, when resources are few due to the increase in demand and degradation, two kinds of scarcities exist. First is the direct scarcity among the beneficiary groups such as farmers and pastoralists, and second is the scarcity influenced by social structures of the society. The latter comes as a result of manipulation of policies to favour the haves while undermining the have nots (the marginalized). The broader policy implication is the need for wider, inclusive, and dynamic review of the formal and informal socio-political structures governing resource distribution as a way of curbing inequalities and resulting conflicts in Africa.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

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